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Abstract
I discuss the debate between dynamical versus geometrical ap-
proaches to spacetime theories, in the context of both special and
general relativity, arguing that (a) the debate takes a substantially
different form in the two cases; (b) different versions of the geometri-
cal approach—only some of which are viable—should be distinguished;
(c) in general relativity, there is no difference between the most viable
version of the geometrical approach and the dynamical approach. In
addition, I demonstrate that what have previously been dubbed two
‘miracles’ of general relativity admit of no resolution from within gen-
eral relativity, on either the dynamical or ‘qualified’ geometrical ap-
proaches, modulo some possible hints that the second ‘miracle’ may be
resolved by appeal to recent results regarding the ‘geodesic principle’
in GR.
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1 Introduction
It is roughly a decade since the groundbreaking work of Brown and
Pooley [6, 7, 8] brought into the mainstream philosophy of physics lit-
erature the debate between dynamical versus geometrical approaches
to spacetime theories. At the most general level, this debate centres
upon the following question: whence the chronogeometric significance
of the metric field? That is, why is the metric field (in theories such as
special and general relativity) surveyed by rods and clocks built from
matter fields? While advocates of the geometrical approach maintain
that the metric field (in some sense) explains or constrains the form of
the dynamical laws for matter fields, such that those fields behave such
as to survey the metric field, advocates of the dynamical approach, by
contrast, claim that an account of the chronogeometric significance
of the metric field may begin from considerations regarding only the
dynamical laws governing matter fields themselves.
Of course, this is vague; in §3 of this paper, I sharpen significantly
the above presentation of the debate. Nevertheless, even at this early
stage, a number of genuine and substantial questions arise. Some of
those which concern me in this paper are the following:
1. Does the dynamical/geometrical debate take the same form in
the context of theories with fixed metric structure (such as spe-
cial relativity (SR)) as it does in theories with dynamical metric
structure (such as general relativity (GR))?
2. What notion of explanation is at play in this debate? Does
answering this question reveal multiple different senses in which
the dynamical/geometrical approaches may be understood?
3. Are the dynamical and geometrical approaches truly distinct
from one another at all?
4. How does the dynamical approach relate to e.g. the ‘spacetime
functionalism’ of Knox [32, 30, 31], or recent discussion on these
matters by Weatherall? [69, §6]
In brief, my answers run as follows. On (1), I argue in §3 of this
paper that there exist significant differences regarding this debate as
it occurs in the context of SR, versus as it occurs in GR. The principal
reason for this is that, while the advocate of the dynamical approach
may be regarded as seeking to ontologically reduce the metric field
in theories with fixed metric structure (such as SR) to the symmetry
properties of matter fields (cf. [10, 42]), she does not attempt to make
such a move in theories with dynamical metric structure, such as GR.1
1For further discussion regarding how this debate changes on moving from SR to GR,
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On (2), I argue in §4 that it is important to distinguish between
what I call ‘qualified’ versus ‘unqualified’ explanations in the context
of this debate.2 Once this distinction is made, the geometrical ap-
proach bifurcates into two positions, which I call, respectively, the
‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ geometrical approaches. In §5, I argue
that distinguishing between these two positions is crucial, for while
the former version of the geometrical approach is tenable, the latter
is not ; nevertheless, these two views have been run together in much
of the literature on this topic up to this point.
On (3), I argue in §5 that, while the ‘unqualified’ version of the
geometrical approach is distinct from the dynamical approach in the
context both of theories such as SR and of theories such as GR, the
‘qualified’ geometrical approach, by contrast, is only distinct from the
dynamical approach in the former context.
On (4), I argue that there is an important sense in which Knox’s
spacetime functionalism, according to which “the spacetime role is
played by whatever defines a structure of local inertial frames” [32,
p. 22], constitutes an extension of the dynamical approach—in essence
stating that whichever structure has chronogeometric significance may
be identified as playing the functional role of spacetime, and therefore,
on a functionalist approach to the definition of physical quantities,
may be identified as being spatiotemporal tout court.3 In addition,
I argue that Weatherall in [69, §6] is most plausibly read as both
(a) embracing spacetime functionalism, and (b) embracing either the
dynamical or the ‘qualified’ geometrical approach.
Along the way, a number of other tasks are accomplished. Most
notably, I demonstrate that what were labelled in [52, §5] two ‘mir-
acles’ of GR—(1) that all dynamical laws for matter fields have the
same local (Poincare´) symmetry properties; and (2) that these local
see [6, 10, 52]. In light of the fact that the advocate of the dynamical approach does not
attempt to undertake an ontological reduction of the above-described kind in the context
of GR, one might be inclined to conclude: ‘So much the worse for the dynamical approach
in the context of GR, as a distinct view in the landscape’. Below, I will argue that there is
something to this concern, for (I maintain) there is no difference in the GR context between
the dynamical approach and the most defensible version of the geometrical approach.
2It is worth flagging that I will offer these two notions of explanation without claiming
(or seeking) to give a full conceptual analysis of the notion of scientific explanation; in
my view, the distinction between ‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ explanations is still a valu-
able and comprehensible one (providing, as I see it, at least some of the “explanatory
concepts” which Norton suggests may be necessary for “a full understanding of construc-
tivism [i.e., the dynamical approach]” [44, p. 824]), even in the absence of such an analysis.
(In this regard, cf. the methodology of [70, pp. 15-16].)
3By contrast, there is a sense in which advocates of the dynamical approach need not
speak of ‘spacetime’ at all—cf. [10, §3.1].
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symmetries coincide (in the relevant regime in which curvature effects
may be ignored) with the symmetries of the ontologically autonomous
metric field in the theory—admit of no resolution from within GR, on
any plausible form of the dynamical or geometrical approaches, mod-
ulo some hints from recent work on the so-called ‘geodesic principle’
in GR regarding the second ‘miracle’.4
2 Background
Before proceeding to the matters outlined above, I review in this sec-
tion some standard discussion regarding (i) the formulation of classical
spacetime theories (§2.1); (ii) symmetries in such theories (§2.2); and
(iii) presentations of special and general relativity (§2.3).
2.1 Spacetime theories
Let us say—following e.g. [2, 48, 49, 59]—that the kinematically pos-
sible models (KPMs) of a given spacetime theory are picked out by
tuples 〈M,Φ1, . . . ,Φn〉, with (a) M a (four-dimensional) differentiable
manifold; and (b) the Φ1, . . . ,Φn various (tensor) fields on M .
5 Given
a class of KPMs for a given theory, let us then say that the dynamically
possible models (DPMs) of that theory are those KPMs the Φ1, . . . ,Φn
of which satisfy certain specified dynamical equations.
To illustrate, consider two examples. First, take a special relativis-
tic massless Klein-Gordon theory (call it KGS). In this theory, KPMs
are triples 〈M,ηab, ϕ〉, where ηab is a fixed Minkowski metric field on
M (fixed identically in all KPMs—see [49, p. 115]), and ϕ is a real
scalar field on M . DPMs of KGS are picked out as those KPMs the
fields of which satisfy the massless Klein-Gordon equation,6
ηab∇a∇bϕ = 0. (1)
4It is worth noting that these two ‘miracles’ of GR may admit of resolution in a successor
theory to GR, in a manner analogous to that in which the ‘miracle’ of the coincidence of
gravitational and inertial masses in Newtonian mechanics was resolved on moving to GR.
See [61] for a detailed discussion of the explanation of the coincidence of gravitational
and inertial masses in GR, and [51] for how the two ‘miracles’ of GR may be resolved on
moving to one particular successor theory—viz., perturbative string theory.
5In principle, we should not exclude other types of field on M—e.g. spinor fields;
pseudotensors; tensor densities; etc. (For arguments for taking these latter two classes of
object seriously, see [45, 46].) In this paper, however, I focus exclusively upon the case in
which the Φi are tensor fields.
6Here, ∇a is the torsion-free derivative compatible with ηab, so that ∇aηbc = 0.
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As a second example, consider a general relativistic Klein-Gordon
theory (call it KGG). In this case, KPMs are again triples 〈M, gab, ϕ〉—
this time, however, gab is a generic Lorentizan metric field on M , not
fixed in all DPMs of the theory. In this case, DPMs are picked out by
the GR Klein-Gordon equation,7
gab∇a∇bϕ = 0, (2)
and the Einstein field equations,8
Gab = 8piTab, (3)
where Tab is the stress-energy tensor associated with ϕ.
9
2.2 Symmetries
I now draw a standard distinction between metric symmetries, and
dynamical symmetries (cf. e.g. [18, §3.4]).
For a given metric field, let us say that a coordinate transformation
is a metric symmetry (sometimes: an isometry) just in case the metric
field is unaltered by the coordinate transformation. For example, the
symmetries of the Minkowski metric field ηab of special relativity are
the Poincare´ transformations—those affine transformations10
xµ → Λµµ′xµ
′
+ aµ (4)
the linear transformation matrix components Λµµ′ of which satisfy
Λ µµ′ Λ
ν
ν′ ηµν = ηµ′ν′ , (5)
and which are hence Lorentz transformations. By contrast, the metric
field gab of GR need not in general have any non-trivial symmetries—
although it might, in particular models of the theory.
In addition to the notion of metric symmetries, it is useful to in-
troduce the notion of a dynamical symmetry. A coordinate transfor-
mation is a dynamical symmetry just in case the dynamical equations
governing non-gravitational fields take the same form in coordinate
7The torsion-free derivative operator ∇a now compatible with gab, so that ∇agbc = 0.
8These are the Einstein field equations with vanishing cosmological constant Λ. For
Λ 6= 0, the field equations read Gab + Λgab = 8piTab.
9Recall that the stress-energy tensor is defined through T ab := 2√g
δS
δgab
, where g is the
metric determinant, and S is the action to which the matter Lagrangian—here LEM—is
associated. Tab is defined from T
ab via Tab := gacgbdT
cd.
10Here, I switch to a coordinate-based description—hence the transition from Roman
(abstract) to Greek indices.
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systems related by that transformation.11 For example, transforming
the SR Klein-Gordon equation (1) from one coordinate system to a
second via an affine transformation12
ηµν∇µ∇νϕ = 0 (6)
−→ ηµνMµµ′Mνν′∇µ
′∇ν′ϕ = 0, (7)
one finds that such an equation is invariant under the transformation
when (5) is satisfied—i.e. if the affine transformation is a Poincare´
transformation. Thus, the dynamical symmetries associated with (1)
at least include the Poincare´ transformations.
2.3 Special and general relativity
Having introduced the necessary details regarding spacetime theories
and their symmetries, in this section I characterise—with both greater
precision and generality—what it means for a given theory to be ‘spe-
cial relativistic’ (§2.3.1), versus ‘general relativistic’ (§2.3.2).
2.3.1 Special relativity
In this paper, I take special relativistic theories to be characterised by
the following two criteria:
• KPMs at least include a fixed Minkowski metric field ηab—so
may be written 〈M,ηab,Φ1, . . . ,Φn〉.
• DPMs are picked out by the requirement that dynamical equa-
tions for the Φ1, . . . ,Φn be Poincare´ invariant.
11In this paper, I mean by ‘matter fields’, or ‘non-gravitational fields’, those for which
there exists an associated stress-energy tensor, and by ‘gravitational fields’ those for which
there exists no such stress-energy tensor—this distinction is in the spirit of [34]. In the
context of GR, this means that the metric field is identified as a gravitational field, whereas
all other fields typically of interest (e.g. Klein-Gordon fields, electromagnetic fields, etc.)
are matter fields. Clearly, there exist subtle issues here regarding the possibility of defining
a stress-energy tensor associated with the metric field in GR—see [15] for a proof against
this possibility, and e.g. [25, 33, 50] for related discussion. Note also that this distinction
between matter and gravitational fields may break down in the case of other spacetime
theories—for example, in Newtonian gravitation theory (cf. §5.2.2), it is possible to define
a stress-energy tensor associated with the potential ϕ, in spite of this field naturally being
regarded as ‘gravitational’ (cf. [17]). Nevertheless, for my purposes, the above distinction
will suffice.
12Here, again, I use a coordinate-based description; in this case the linear transformation
matrix components in this affine transformation are written Mµµ′ , for reasons which shall
become clear. Note that I do not transform the fixed fields—cf. [49, p. 115].
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The latter criterion is referred to by Brown as the big principle—
see e.g. [6, §8.4.1].13 Note that, by construction, metric and dynamical
symmetries coincide in special relativistic theories.
2.3.2 General relativity
Turn now to the question of what it is for a spacetime theory to be
general relativistic. For the purposes of this paper, I take such theories
to be characterised by the following two criteria:
• KPMs at least include a Lorentzian metric field gab—so may be
written 〈M, gab,Φ1, . . . ,Φn〉.
• DPMs are picked out by dynamical equations for the Φ1, . . . ,Φn,
along with the Einstein field equations Gab = 8piTab, where Tab
is the stress-energy tensor for the Φ1, . . . ,Φn.
This characterisation of a general relativistic theory is very weak—
note, in particular, that there is no guarantee in general relativistic
theories so understood that metric symmetries coincide locally with
dynamical symmetries (as was the case for special relativistic theories,
as presented above).14 Such requirements may be imposed via restric-
tion to those models of GR which satisfy further conditions; from the
point of view of the matter of symmetry coincidence, one particular
auxiliary condition which will be of significance is:15
• Instantiation of the strong equivalence principle (SEP).
Whence this third assumption? What exactly is the SEP, and why
need it be imposed in one’s characterisation of a general relativistic
theory? A full answer to these questions will require some detailed
discussion.
The SEP is intended to capture facts regarding the ‘local validity’
of SR in GR. Brown puts the point thus:16
13In his 1908 paper [40], Minkowski referred to this principle as the world-postulate—for
discussion, see [6, §8.1].
14One further observation about the distinction between special versus general relativis-
tic theories as characterised above: Since the metric field ηab of SR is fixed identically in
all KPMs, so too is the manifold M on which that field is defined. Not so for GR: since it
is not definitional of a general relativistic theory that it contain a certain fixed field, there
may exist models with distinct manifolds M .
15Other conditions which one may be interested in imposing upon the class of GR
solutions in which one is interested are e.g. energy conditions, for such conditions are often
understood to be tied to the restriction to ‘physically reasonable’ matter (for example,
to conditions that energy cannot be negative). For a recent virtuoso study of energy
conditions, see [14].
16Other similar presentations of the SEP can be found in e.g. [30, §3.4] and [31, p. 874].
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There exists in a neighbourhood of each event preferred co-
ordinates, called locally inertial at that event. For each fun-
damental non-gravitational interaction, to the extent that
tidal gravitational forces can be ignored, the laws govern-
ing the interaction find their simplest form in these coor-
dinates. This is their special relativistic form, independent
of spacetime location. [6, p. 169]
Here, there exist a number of subtleties regarding what is meant by
the qualification “to the extent that tidal gravitational forces can be ig-
nored”, and moreover regarding whether other foundational principles
GR—for example minimal coupling, which is a heuristic prescription
for the construction of dynamical laws for non-gravitational fields in
GR from those in SR—are compatible with the SEP as formulated
above. Since these matters are not directly relevant to my purposes
in this paper, I refer the reader to [9, 10, 52] for detailed discussion.
For today, the essential aspect of the SEP is the imposition that, in
the neighbourhood of any p ∈M in GR, laws of physics recover their
‘special relativistic form’—where I shall understand this to mean: a
Poincare´ invariant form. Clearly, this is a particular restriction on
the matter sector in the theory.
To illustrate, consider again the general relativistic Klein-Gordon
equation (2). Written in an arbitrary coordinate basis, this reads
gµν∂
µ∂νϕ+ Γµνµ∂
νϕ = 0. (8)
Recall that in a coordinate basis {eµ}, the connection compo-
nents Γµνρ associated to a derivative operator ∇a are defined by
∇ρeν =: Γµνρeµ. Then, at any p ∈ M , we can choose normal coordi-
nates, such that Γµ(νρ) (p) = 0 in those coordinates; for a torsion-free
derivative operator, we can in fact choose normal coordinates such
that Γµνρ (p) = 0. (Note that the connection components away from
p will in general not vanish.) If the unique torsion-free, metric com-
patible derivative operator is used, then in normal coordinates we also
have gµν,ρ (p) = 0, and one may further restrict to the subset of nor-
mal coordinates at p such that gµν (p) = diag (−1, 1, 1, 1). Since gµν (p)
takes this diagonal form—preserved under Poincare´ transformations—
in this restricted class of normal coordinates at p, one might write
gµν (p) = ηµν (cf. e.g. [41, p. 1055]). This notwithstanding, how-
ever, any claim to the effect that the metric field ‘reduces’ to the
the Minkowski metric at p in normal coordinates should be met with
suspicion—for in general, second (and higher) order derivatives of the
metric field do not vanish at p, in these coordinates.
In normal coordinates at p ∈ M , (2) (in a coordinate basis, (8))
takes a particularly simple form at p:
9
ηµν∂
µ∂νϕ = 0; (9)
moreover, this form (with the metric field diagonalised) is retained
in all frames related by Poincare´ transformations. This illustrates the
sense in which certain dynamical equations for non-gravitational fields
recover locally a Poincare´ invariant form. That all dynamical laws for
non-gravitational fields in GR manifest this quality is a statement of
the SEP. Importantly, note that, absent the imposition of the SEP, it
is not the case that all dynamical equations for matter fields in GR
need be locally Poincare´ invariant. For example, there exists no a
priori prohibition on the existence of matter fields obeying dynam-
ical laws which are locally Galilean invariant, in a spacetime theory
with a dynamical, Lorentzian metric field satisfying the Einstein field
equations.17
Why should one restrict to those solutions of GR in which the SEP
is satisfied? The reason is that this principle—which ensures that,
locally, the (Poincare´) symmetries of the metric field18 coincide with
the (Poincare´) symmetries of the dynamical laws governing matter
fields—is typically regarded to constitute an important condition for
the chronogeometricity of the metric field—that is, for intervals as
given by the metric field to be read off by stable rods and clocks built
from matter fields. As Brown writes,19
It is because of ... local Lorentz covariance that rods and
clocks, built out of the matter fields which display that
symmetry, behave as if they were reading aspects of the
metric field and in so doing confer on this field a geomet-
ric meaning. That light rays trace out null geodesics of
the field is again a consequence of the strong equivalence
principle, which asserts that locally Maxwell’s equations of
electrodynamics are valid. [6, p. 176]
That is, the SEP is, it is argued, an important condition for the
17See [30, 51] for discussion of this possibility.
18Again, modulo subtle issues regarding the qualification “to the extent that tidal grav-
itational forces can be ignored”—see [9, 10, 52] for discussion.
19One might reasonably pause over whether the “as if” in the following passage is
necessary, on Brown’s account.
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metric field gab in GR to have (local) operational meaning.
20,21 I return
to discuss further the SEP, in light of the so-called geodesic principle
in GR, in §6.
3 The dynamical/geometrical debate
The above in hand, in this section I demonstrate how the dynam-
ical/geometrical debate plays out in the context of both SR (§3.1)
and GR (§3.2);22 a detailed reconsideration of the geometrical ap-
proach will follow in §§4-5. At the most general level, the dynami-
cal/geometrical debate centres upon the following question:
Whence the metric field’s chronogeometric significance?
Taking, as elaborated above, the (local) coincidence of metric and
dynamical symmetries to be an important condition which must be
fulfilled in one important means via which the metric field acquires
its chronogeometric significance (viz., via the SEP), one antecedent
question which one might seek to address in order to answer the above
is the following:23
Why do metric symmetries coincide (locally) with dynam-
ical symmetries?24
20One might wonder whether satisfaction of the SEP should be regarded as being a
necessary condition for the metric field to have its chronogeometric significance, or rather
as being a sufficient condition, or rather something else. In [52, pp. 15-16], it is indeed
claimed that the SEP constitutes a necessary condition for chronogeometricity; however, it
is perhaps more conservative to state that, with auxiliary assumptions such as the existence
of stable rods and clocks, it constitutes a jointly sufficient condition for chronogeometricity.
In this way, one does not rule out other possible means of gaining operational access to
the metric field—for example, by using test particles which traverse null and timelike
geodesics to gain access to conformal and projective structure, from which (via Weyl’s
theorem-type reasoning—cf. [20, 72, 73], and with certain further additional assumptions)
one can recover metric structure. There remains much further work to be done in order
to understand fully these alternative means of gaining operational access to the metric
field; cf. footnote 55 for some further discussion of Weyl’s theorem, and [11, §4] for related
discussion.
21Similarly, one might argue that postulating that metric symmetries coincide with
dynamical symmetries in SR is an important condition for the metric field ηab to have
operational meaning in that case.
22There is a sense in which the lessons of §§3.1 and 3.2 can be generalised to all theories
with, respectively, fixed versus dynamical metric structure—see [10, §5].
23For the time being, my focus is on this mode of gaining operational access to the
metric field—though I concede that there may be other means, as discussed in footnote
20 above, and in §6 below.
24The ‘locally’ qualification is of particular significance in GR, since the SEP ensures
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It is upon this latter question that much of the dynamical/geometrical
debate has focussed. Prima facie, advocates of the dynamical ap-
proach (developed in particular by Brown and Pooley [6, 7, 8]) ap-
pear to offer very different accounts of this coincidence of symmetries
to advocates of the geometrical approach (for example, Friedman or
Maudlin [22, 38]). In the remainder of this section, I discuss the dy-
namical/geometrical debate in the context of both SR (§3.1) and GR
(§3.2).
3.1 Special relativity
In this subsection, I consider the account of the coincidence of metric
and dynamical symmetries in SR proffered on the part of advocates
of the geometrical (§3.1.1) and dynamical (§3.1.2) approaches.
3.1.1 The geometrical approach
Why, in special relativistic theories, do dynamical symmetries coincide
with symmetries of the Minkowski metric field ηab? Advocates of the
geometrical approach to spacetime theories seek to answer this ques-
tion via some appeal to ηab itself. To be specific, in this paper I focus
upon a version (later: versions) of the approach according to which
the Minkowski metric field ηab of SR is ontologically autonomous and
primitive, and (somehow; in some sense to be cashed out) constrains
the possible form of dynamical equations for matter, such that metric
symmetries coincide with dynamical symmetries. As Maudlin writes,
[38, pp. 117-8]
... the Minkowski geometry takes exactly the same form
described in [any] Lorentz coordinate system (by the sym-
metry of Minkowski spacetime), and the laws of physics
take exactly the same coordinate-based form when stated
in a coordinate-based language in any Lorentz coordinate
system (because the laws can only advert to the Minkowski
geometry, and it has the same coordinate-based descrip-
tion). (My emphasis.)
That a notion of constraint is at play on this view is manifest in
the italicised portion of the above quotation. While advocates of the
dynamical approach often object that such a notion of constraint or
explanation is mysterious—for example, Brown writes “It is wholly
unclear how this geometrical explanation is supposed to work.” [6,
the local coincidence of metric and dynamical symmetries, in the neighbourhood of a given
point p ∈M .
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p. 134]—I will assess in §4 the extent to which such objections find
their mark. In the meantime, I turn to the dynamical approach to
SR.
3.1.2 The dynamical approach
The dynamical approach offers a very different perspective on the
coincidence of metric and dynamical symmetries in SR. According to
this view, the metric field ηab is not ontologically autonomous and
primitive; rather, it is a codification of the symmetry properties of
the dynamical equations governing matter fields. (One may, therefore,
understand the dynamical approach to SR—and to theories with fixed
metric structure more generally—as an ontological thesis; as a form of
relationalism—cf. [48, §6.3.2].) As Brown puts it: (Cf. also [8, p. 80].)
The appropriate structure is Minkowski geometry precisely
because the laws of physics of the non-gravitational inter-
actions are Lorentz covariant. [6, p. 133]
In other words (those of Myrvold), on the dynamical view,
[T]he connection between spacetime [metric] structure and
dynamical symmetries and asymmetries is analytic. [42,
p. 13]
If such a view regarding the analytic connection between metric
and dynamical symmetries can be made to hold together, then that
metric and dynamical symmetries coincide in SR follows automati-
cally ; in this way, a straightforward account of this coincidence is,
apparently, available.
The question of whether the dynamical approach to SR is viable
has been widely discussed—see e.g. [1, 6, 26, 29, 44, 48, 56, 57]. In this
paper, I focus on a different issue: whether advocates of the dynamical
approach have been fair to the geometrical approach, and whether
‘geometricians’ can, in fact, offer a coherent answer to the question of
why metric and dynamical symmetries coincide, in SR. Before doing
so, however, I consider how the nature of the dynamical/geometrical
debate shifts on moving to GR.
3.2 General relativity
In the GR context, advocates of both the dynamical and geomet-
rical approaches agree that the metric field gab is an ontologically
autonomous entity, obeying its own dynamical equations, and not
straightforwardly reducible to (symmetries of dynamical equations
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governing) matter fields, as per the dynamical approach to SR.25 How-
ever, the two approaches prima facie continue to issue different ver-
dicts on the question of why metric and dynamical symmetries may be
taken (locally) to coincide. In this subsection, I review the geometrical
(§3.2.1) and dynamical (§3.2.2) approaches to GR.
3.2.1 The geometrical approach
Advocates of the version (later: versions) of the geometrical approach
to GR under consideration in this paper maintain that, locally in the
neighbourhood of any p ∈M (and in the regime in which ‘tidal grav-
itational forces’ may be ignored—cf. §2.3.2), metric and dynamical
symmetries coincide (in accordance with the SEP), because the met-
ric field gab (somehow; in some sense to be cashed out) constrains
the possible form of dynamical equations for matter, such that met-
ric symmetries coincide (locally) with dynamical symmetries. While,
again, the advocate of the dynamical approach may find the notion
of constraint here mysterious, I discuss in §§4-5 the extent to which
these matters can be accounted for by advocates of the geometrical
approach.
3.2.2 The dynamical approach
Assuming that the metric field in GR is not ontologically reducible to
(symmetries of dynamical laws governing) matter fields, the foregoing
(cf. §3.1.2) proffered explanation on the part of advocates of the dy-
namical approach to SR cannot be applied in the GR context. Thus,
for the advocate of the dynamical approach, there are two brute facts
in GR—two conspiracies, or ‘miracles’, which lack further explanation
from within the theory—whereas in SR there is only one (see below):26
MR1: All non-gravitational interactions are locally governed by Poincare´
invariant dynamical laws.
MR2: The Poincare´ symmetries of the dynamical laws governing
non-gravitational fields in the neighbourhood of any point p ∈M
coincide (in the regime in which terms representing ‘tidal gravi-
25There exist significant difficulties regarding attempts to tell such a story of ontological
reduction in GR; an obvious illustration can be found in the existence of vacuum solutions
in the theory. This said, the question of whether an ontological excision of the metric
field in GR is possible remains of philosophical and conceptual interest—particularly to
advocates of the dynamical approach, for whom this would afford a means of bringing
their approach to GR into line with their approach to SR.
26See [52, §5], where the terminology of ‘miracles’ was introduced, for further discussion.
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tational forces’ can be ignored) with the symmetries of the metric
field in that neighbourhood.
There are two points to make here. First, note that MR1 held
also in SR: that all non-gravitational interactions are (locally) gov-
erned by Poincare´ invariant dynamical laws is a brute fact—an outset
assumption—in both theories, which (the advocate of the dynamical
approach contends) admits of no further explanation from within each
theory. Second, as I argue in §5.3, while an untenable form of the geo-
metrical approach may purport to account for both MR1 and MR2,
any acceptable form of the geometrical approach must also accept these
two miracles of GR. In this sense, the existence of these two miracles
is independent of the dynamical/geometrical debate.
4 Qualified and unqualified explana-
tions
In §5, I consider whether the advocate of the geometrical approach
has received an unduly rough ride in the recent philosophical litera-
ture. Essentially, my answer will be affirmative, because an untenably
strong form of the geometrical approach has constituted the target of
e.g. [6, 8, 9, 52]. In order to make these points, however, I must first
distinguish between what I call qualified versus unqualified explana-
tions:
• (Qualified explanations.) Consider one particular dynamical equa-
tion featuring coupling to a metric field—for example, the special
relativistic Klein-Gordon equation (1), or the general relativis-
tic Klein-Gordon equation (2). Then ask: might the metric field
in the theory in question (ηab in the case of KGS; gab in the
case of KGG) feature in an explanation of the form (in partic-
ular, of the symmetries) of that dynamical equation, and of the
behaviour of the matter field(s) (here ϕ) to which it is coupled?
Call this the question of qualified explanation—for the concern
here is with accounting for the form of one, given dynamical
equation, and for the behaviour of the particular fields coupled
in that equation.
• (Unqualified explanations.) Consider all possible dynamical equa-
tions consistent with a given theory, such as SR or GR.27 Then
27There is some ambiguity regarding what is meant by a ‘theory’ here. To be clear, by
‘theory’ is meant here a theoretical framework such as that for SR or GR as presented in
§2.3, rather than specific theories within those frameworks, such as KGS or KGG.
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ask: does the metric field in the theory in question (ηab in the
case of SR; gab in the case of GR) explain the form (in particular,
the symmetries) of all those possible equations consistent with
the theory, and (in a certain particular way to be articulated)
the behaviour of all possible matter fields, such that assumptions
made in the formulation of the theory regarding the form of those
equations and the behaviour of matter fields (e.g., that massless
particles in GR traverse null geodesics) are, ultimately, redun-
dant? For example, can ηab explain the fact that all dynamical
laws governing matter fields in SR are Poincare´ invariant, or can
gab in GR explain the SEP? Call this the question of unqualified
explanation.
5 The geometrical approach
In this section, the above distinction between qualified and unqualified
explanations is brought to bear on the question of whether there exists
any viable form of the geometrical approach. My answer will be the
following: while the form of the geometrical approach considered in
e.g. [6, 8, 9, 52] is not viable, there exists a weaker version of the
approach, which can be defended.
The section proceeds as follows. In §5.1, I distinguish between
these two versions of the geometrical approach, before exploring the
different accounts they give regarding the role of the metric field in
explanations of the coincidence of (local) metric and dynamical sym-
metries, and of the behaviour of matter fields to which they couple,
in both SR (§5.1.1) and GR (§5.1.2). In §5.2, I explore some further
consequences of what I take to be the more defensible version of the
geometrical approach. In §5.3, I demonstrate that this version of the
geometrical approach does not account for MR1 and MR2.
5.1 Two geometrical approaches
The geometrical approach, in both SR (§3.1.1) and GR (§3.2.1), may
be understood in (at least) two different ways. Drawing upon the
distinction presented in §4, the versions of the approach that I consider
in this paper are dubbed the qualified versus unqualified geometrical
approaches:
• (Qualified geometrical approach.) Consider a particular dynam-
ical equation governing the behaviour of a particular set of non-
gravitational fields Φ1, . . . ,Φn. Insofar as that equation features
coupling to a metric field (as in e.g. (1) in KGS, or (2) in KGG),
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that metric field may contribute to an explanation of the symme-
tries of that dynamical equation, and of the dynamical behaviour
of those Φ1, . . . ,Φn fields.
• (Unqualified geometrical approach.) Consider the metric field
associated with a particular theory (for example, ηab in SR, or
gab in GR). That metric field constrains the form of all possible
dynamical laws for non-gravitational fields consistent with that
theory, such that assumptions about (local) dynamical symme-
tries are redundant in the formulation of the theory, and such
that certain facts about the behaviour of matter fields are fixed.
In the following, I abbreviate ‘the qualified geometrical approach’
to QGA, and ‘the unqualified geometrical approach’ to UGA. On
QGA, a particular metric field coupling to a particular set of non-
gravitational fields in a particular dynamical equation may be un-
derstood to contribute to a qualified explanation (in the sense in §4)
of the symmetries of that dynamical equation, and of the dynamical
behaviour of those non-gravitational fields. On UGA, a particular
metric field is taken to explain the symmetries of all possible dy-
namical equations in a given theory, and to fix certain facts about
the behaviour of all possible matter fields, such that we need not, in
fact, make any assumptions regarding dynamical symmetries, or about
those dynamical facts, in that theory. (Importantly, I take both QGA
and UGA to maintain the ontological autonomy of the metric field
in both SR and GR.) It is principally UGA which is attacked in
[6, 8, 9, 52], and it is this version of the geometrical approach which
is (I maintain) untenable.
5.1.1 Special relativity
The reasons why UGA is untenable are similar in both the SR and
GR cases; I begin with the former. The worry regarding UGA is put
clearly by Brown and Pooley: [8, p. 84]
As a matter of logic alone, if one postulates spacetime struc-
ture as a self-standing, autonomous element in one’s theory,
it need have no constraining role on the form of the laws
governing the rest of the theory’s models. So how is its
influence supposed to work? Unless this question is an-
swered, spacetime cannot be taken to explain the Lorentz
covariance of the dynamical laws.
The point here is that it is consistent to have dynamical laws for
non-gravitational fields in a theory featuring a Minkowski metric field
ηab, which nevertheless do not manifest the Poincare´ symmetries of
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that metric field. As a concrete example, consider a modified version of
KGS—call it LAS—KPMs of which are quadruples 〈M,ηab, δab, ϕ〉,
where δab is a four-dimensional fixed Euclidean metric field,
28 and
DPMs of which are picked out by the four-dimensional Laplace equa-
tion (hence my chosen nomenclature),29
δab∇a∇bϕ = 0. (10)
The dynamical symmetries of (10) do not include the Poincare´
transformations (as for (1)); rather, they include the Euclidean trans-
formations: those affine transformations the linear transformation ma-
trix of which satisfies (cf. (5))
M µµ′ M
ν
ν′ δµν = δµ′ν′ . (11)
LAS illustrates that a theory’s featuring a certain metric field in
its KPMs is insufficient for that theory’s dynamical equations for non-
gravitational fields to manifest the symmetries of that metric field, or
for that metric field to play any constraining role in the dynamics of
the matter fields in that theory, for those non-gravitational fields may
couple to other fields (in this case, δab), such that metric symmetries
and dynamical symmetries do not coincide, and such that the mat-
ter fields manifest other dynamical behaviour (than that which they
would manifest if they were coupled to the metric field under con-
sideration, here ηab). Of course, one may wish to exclude coupling
to such other fields; however, note that we then return to the situa-
tion in which the dynamical equations for matter fields manifesting
certain symmetries, and yielding certain behaviour for those matter
fields (e.g., that massless particles propagate on null geodesics), is an
input assumption—it does not follow from (e.g.) ηab alone.
On the other hand, QGA faces no such problems, for in this case
the concern is not with generic, unqualified claims, but rather with
the form of one particular dynamical equation and with the dynam-
ical behaviour of the matter fields coupled in that equation. Why is
(1) Poincare´ invariant? Because it features coupling to the ηab field—
cf. §2.2. Why is (10) Euclidean invariant? Because it features coupling
to δab. Changing ηab in (1) to δab in (10) changes the behaviour of
ϕ accordingly (after all, it is now governed by a different dynamical
equation)—and it is very plausible to regard this as constituting a
legitimate (if partial, for other factors may also be relevant to the
28The notation δab is chosen to emphasise the analogy with the Kronecker delta δ
a
b ;
strictly, however, these are different objects, and should not be confused.
29Note that (10) is simply (1), with ηab replaced by δab; in making this move, the dy-
namical equation becomes an elliptic, rather than hyperbolic, partial differential equation.
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dynamics of the field in question) explanation of the behaviour of ϕ.
Thus, I take it that, in SR (and indeed, in the context of theories with
fixed metric structure more generally), it is incorrect to regard as vi-
able the explanation for the dynamical behaviour of matter proffered
on the part of advocates of UGA, but correct to so regard the expla-
nations proffered on the part of advocates of QGA. I discuss QGA
further in §5.2.
5.1.2 General relativity
Similar points to those made above apply in the case of GR. According
to advocates of UGA, the metric field gab in GR accounts for the local
behaviour of all non-gravitational fields, such that the assumption of
the SEP in the presentation of general relativistic theories in §2.3.2 is
redundant, and such that matter fields must exhibit certain behaviour
(e.g., such that test particles propagate on null geodesics). However,
against such a claim, problem cases may also be identified.
In parallel with our introduction of LAS in §5.1.1, I present here
one such theory: the Jacobson-Mattingly theory (introduced in e.g. [12,
27]30), in which the action for a coupled Einstein-Maxwell system is
augmented with an additional term (via a Lagrange multiplier field
λ), imposing (as a field equation, via variation with respect to λ) that
the vector potential Aa be locally timelike:31
SJM [gab, A
a, λ] =
∫
d4x
√−g
(
R− 1
4
F abFab + λ
(
gabA
aAb − 1
))
.
(12)
The imposition of this Lagrange multiplier term means that, in
this theory, the dynamical behaviour of non-gravitational fields does
not reflect the local (Poincare´) symmetries of the metric field. Rather,
the (local) symmetries of the dynamical laws are a proper subset of
the (local) metric symmetries. Given this, however, we appear to
have in our possession a problem case for UGA, according to which
the metric field constrains dynamical equations to manifest its own
symmetries.
As with LAS in the case of SR, such cases appear to find their mark
against UGA, for in the Jacobson-Mattingly theory, metric symme-
tries manifestly do not coincide with dynamical symmetries—so how
30In fact, the version of the Jacobson-Mattingly theory discussed here is a special case
of that presented in [12, 27].
31The first term is the Einstein-Hilbert action; Fab is the Faraday tensor associated to
Aa. In this paper, I take it that in GR (or, as here, the Jacobson-Mattingly theory) a
vector ξa at a point is timelike just in case gabξ
aξb > 0.
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could gab be constraining the local form of dynamical equations in this
strong sense? On the other hand, QGA again does not appear to face
such problems. For example, consider (2)—as in the SR context, it is
perfectly reasonable to claim that the coupling in this equation of ϕ to
gab offers an explanation of the dynamical behaviour of ϕ; moreover,
the fact that no generic, unqualified claim is made regarding possible
form of dynamical equations for non-gravitational fields means that
cases such as the Jacobson-Mattingly theory do not find their mark
against QGA (for further discussion, see §5.2.2).
5.2 The qualified geometrical approach
I have argued that QGA is a defensible version of the geometrical
approach, whereas UGA is not. In this subsection, I explore some
further consequences of QGA. Specifically, I consider in §5.2.1 the
sense in which the metric field in a given theory may, in fact, be un-
derstood to account for the form of all dynamical laws in that theory.
In §5.2.2, I consider whether an account of the dynamical behaviour
of matter in terms of metric structure is available on QGA, even in
problematic cases such as those described above, in which (local) met-
ric symmetries do not coincide with (local) dynamical symmetries.32
I close in §5.2.3 by drawing a more fine-grained distinction within
QGA.
5.2.1 Univocal explanation
In both SR and GR, there is a sense in which, on QGA, the met-
ric field can explain the form of all dynamical laws in the theory—
once the restriction to a certain form of dynamical equations is made.
For example, given the restriction in SR to dynamical equations for
non-gravitational fields which take a Poincare´ invariant form, we may
write all such equations in coordinate-free notion featuring coupling
to ηab
33—in which case, ηab may feature in explanations of the dy-
namical behaviour of the matter fields under consideration. This does
not explain the initial restriction to Poincare´ invariant dynamical laws
for non-gravitational fields, but it does mean that ηab may feature in
explanations for the behaviour of all matter fields, once such an as-
sumption is made. Similarly in GR, the metric field gab may not be
able to account for the initial restriction to dynamical equations for
matter fields obeying the SEP, but it may feature in explanations of
32Strictly, I will have to generalise the notion of a ‘metric symmetry’ in §5.2.2, to account
for the examples given in that section. This, however, will be of no consequence.
33Cf. [9, §5].
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the form of all dynamical laws for non-gravitational fields in GR, once
this assumption is made—for in making this assumption, it is natural
to consider dynamical equations in which matter fields are coupled to
this very gab field.
34
5.2.2 Partial explanation
A further subtlety regarding QGA pertains to the issue of partial
explanation. I make the following claim: even in the cases in which
metric and dynamical symmetries do not coincide, the metric field
may feature in explanations of the dynamical behaviour of matter,
on QGA.35 To see this, it is useful to consider three sub-cases: (i)
situations in which dynamical symmetries form a proper subset of
metric symmetries; (ii) situations in which dynamical symmetries form
a proper superset of metric symmetries; (iii) cases where dynamical
symmetries partially overlap with metric symmetries.
In order to discuss each of these cases, it is useful to introduce
here three versions of Newtonian gravitation theory (NGT). First, let
a Leibnizian structure be a triple 〈M, tab, hab〉, where M is a four-
dimensional differentiable manifold; tab is a fixed temporal ‘metric’
field on M of signature (1, 0, 0, 0); and hab is a fixed spatial (inverse)
‘metric’ field on M of signature (0, 1, 1, 1).36 The tab and h
ab fields are
orthogonal, so that
habtbc = 0; (13)
furthermore, I restrict in this paper to structures (Leibnizian or oth-
erwise; see below) which are temporally orientable, so that there exists
34It is worth making two related points here. (1): Technically, such coupling is not
essential, for we might instead couple to e.g. a fixed Minkowski metric field ηab, or to a
generic Lorentzian metric field which satisfies not the Einstein field equations, but some
other set of dynamical equations. In the cases in which all dynamical laws feature coupling
to gab, however, this metric field may feature in explanations of the form of all these laws.
(2): One need not make the assumption that all dynamical laws manifest certain (local)
symmetries so explicitly—one might instead make assumptions of (e.g.) universal coupling
of the metric field to matter fields in all dynamical equations for the latter; this may,
then, entail the relevant facts about the symmetries of those laws. This, indeed, appears
to be Maudlin’s stance, when he writes that “the fundamental requirement of a relativistic
theory is that the physical laws should be specifiable using only the relativistic space-time
geometry. For Special Relativity, this means in particular Minkowski space-time.” [38,
p. 117] The point here is that, on QGA, one may appeal to the metric field in giving
certain generic explanations of the behaviour of matter fields in a certain restricted class
of models of the theory—but the metric field itself does not account for those restrictions.
35I am grateful to Oliver Pooley for impressing this point upon me.
36Scare quotes are included on ‘metric’ here, for strictly neither tab nor h
ab satisfies the
metric non-degeneracy condition—cf. [37, §4.1].
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a continuous (globally defined) one-form ta that satisfies the decom-
position condition tab = tatb at every point [37, p. 251].
In contrast with the notion of a Leibnizian structure, let a Galilean
structure be a quadruple 〈M, tab, hab,∇a〉, consisting of a Leibnizian
structure, together with a derivative operator ∇a on M satisfying the
compaibility conditions
∇atbc = 0, (14)
∇ahbc = 0. (15)
Finally, let a Newtonian structure be a tuple 〈M, tab, hab,∇a, σa〉,
consisting of a Galilean structure, together with a fixed vector field σa
on M , such that
tabσ
b 6= 0. (16)
Since none of Leibnizian, Galilean, or Newtonian structures are
themselves metric fields, the notion of a metric symmetry cannot be
applied in these cases.37 However, the relevant notion easily gener-
alises to the structures now under consideration: I say that a coordi-
nate transformation is a structure symmetry just in case the structure
under consideration is invariant under that transformation. Apply-
ing such a notion to Leibnizian, Galilean, and Newtonian structures,
one finds that their associated structures symmetries are given by (no
surprise!) the Leibniz, Galilean, and Newton groups.38
With these three structures in hand, we can consider three different
theories—viz., Newtonian gravitation theory set in each of these three
structures. Consider first Newtonian mechanics set in a Galilean struc-
ture.39 KPMs of this theory are tuples 〈M, tab, hab,∇a, ϕ, ρ〉, where ϕ
and ρ are real scalar fields on M , which will be taken to represent the
gravitational potential and matter density, respectively. DPMs of this
theory are picked out by the field equations40
37For details regarding Leibnizian, Galilean, and Newtonian structures, see [18, ch. 2].
38The exact mathematical forms of these groups are not relevant for our purposes—see
[48, §3.1] for details.
39A Galilean structure is traditionally considered to be the ‘most appropriate’ spacetime
setting for NGT, for in this case structure symmetries and dynamical symmetries (are
claimed to) coincide, thereby satisfying Earman’s “adequacy conditions” on spacetime
theories (see [18, §3.4]). For recent philosophical discussion calling into question whether
this orthodoxy is correct, see [16, 31, 53, 58, 60, 66, 68]; I do not discuss further such
matters in this paper.
40Here, Rabcd is the Riemann tensor associated with the derivative operator ∇a defined
in the Galilean structure.
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Rabcd = 0, (17)
hab∇a∇bϕ = 4piρ. (18)
(17) imposes flatness of ∇a; (18) is the Newton-Poisson equation.
Finally, the gravitational force on a point (test) particle of mass m is
given by −mhab∇bϕ; it follows from Newton’s second law that, if this
particle is subject to no forces except gravity, and given that it has
four-velocity ξa, then it satisfies
−∇aϕ = ξb∇bξa. (19)
Note that all elements of the Galilean structure feature in these
dynamical equations; one can use this structure to offer a qualified
explanation (in the sense of §4) of the form of these dynamical laws.
Newtonian mechanics set in Galilean spacetime is a case in which
structure symmetries coincide with dynamical symmetries.41 Now
consider a more nuanced case, in which dynamical symmetries con-
stitute a proper subset of structure symmetries. One illustration of
this is Newtonian mechanics set in a Leibnizian structure. KPMs of
this ‘theory’ are tuples 〈M, tab, hab, ϕ, ρ〉 with 〈M, tab, hab〉 a Leibnizian
structure, and ϕ and ρ defined as in the Galilean case; DPMs are (al-
legedly) picked out by (17)-(19). For the sake of argument granting
that such a ‘theory’ is coherent,42 we have a case in which dynamical
symmetries are a proper subset of structure symmetries. What I con-
tend here is that, in spite of the fact that structure symmetries and
dynamical symmetries do not coincide, the fact that the Leibnizian
structure still features in the DPMs of this theory means that it can
still offer a partial (but not complete, since the laws also advert to
other structure) explanation of the dynamical behaviour of matter in
this case, in the qualified sense delineated in §4 above.
Next consider the case in which dynamical symmetries are a proper
superset of structure symmetries.43 An illustration of such a scenario
is Newtonian mechanics set in a Newtonian structure. In this case,
KPMs are tuples 〈M, tab, hab,∇a, σa, ϕ, ρ〉, where 〈M, tab, hab,∇a, σa〉
41Setting aside the issues indicated in footnote 39.
42Indeed, I here include scare quotes on the word ‘theory’, as there are good grounds
to question whether such a ‘theory’ is really coherent, since it does not have sufficient
structure in its KPMs to be able to write down the dynamical equations used to fix its
DPMs—cf. [55, p. 6]. (Belot puts the point pithily, when he accuses those working with
such theories of “arrant knavery” [5, p. 571]; for further related discussion, cf. [16, pp. 268-
269].)
43On this possibility, cf. Pooley’s discussion at [48, p. 94].
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is a Newtonian structure (in which the integral curves of σa are taken
to represent the worldlines of the persisting points of Newtonian ab-
solute space), and ϕ and ρ are understood as above; DPMs of this
theory are again picked out by (17)-(19). Though this theory is co-
herent,44 as Earman states [18, §3.4], there is a sense in which it is
nevertheless malformed, for the dynamical laws do not advert to all
the Newtonian structure available in the KPMs of the theory (it is
this which results in dynamical symmetries being a proper superset
of structure symmetries). While I concur with Earman on this point,
what I wish to register here is that, in this case, Newtonian structure
may still be appealed to in explanations of the form of the dynamical
laws governing matter fields—it is just that this structure has other,
redundant explanatory apparata available to it (viz., the σa field).
Thus, on QGA, in the case in which dynamical symmetries are
a subset of structure symmetries, the relevant structure (whether
metric, or e.g. Leibnizian/Galilean/Newtonian) may feature in par-
tial explanations of the dynamical behaviour of matter. In the case in
which dynamical symmetries are a superset of structure symmetries,
by contrast, the relevant structure may feature in total but redun-
dant explanations of the dynamical behaviour of matter. Note that
Jacobson-Mattingly theory of §5.1.2 instantiates the former case, in
which dynamical symmetries are a subset of metric symmetries.45
Finally, consider the case in which dynamical symmetries partially
overlap with structure symmetries—i.e., are neither a subset nor a
superset of structure symmetries. One example of this is LAS, pre-
sented in §5.1.1. In this case, dynamical symmetries include the Eu-
clidean transformations; symmetries of the Minkowski metric field ηab
are the Poincare´ transformations. The intersection of the Euclidean
and Poincare´ groups is the group of translations and spatial rotations
(cf. [52, §B]); therefore, the corresponding degrees of freedom associ-
ated to the ηab field may still be used to account for these dynami-
cal symmetries, in this case. (Though of course, an obvious question
arises: why not instead appeal to δab when giving this kind of qualified
explanation of dynamical symmetries in this case?)
44At least on QGA—it is questionable whether this theory is coherent on the dynamical
approach, according to which (as discussed above) metric/structure symmetries in theories
with fixed metric/structure (such as both SR and NGT) just are dynamical symmetries.
Cf. [10, §3.1].
45Though in this case the theory is coherent, in a way that arguably NGT set in a
Leibnizian structure is not—cf. footnote 42.
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5.2.3 Confident and cautious qualified approaches
Suppose that one embraces QGA, and suppose that one is consider-
ing a theory in which the metric/structure under consideration can
be appealed to in order to offer a qualified explanation of the sym-
metries of the dynamical laws governing matter fields. For example,
suppose that one is considering theories such as KGS, or Newtonian
mechanics set in a Galilean structure. Even in such cases, there ex-
ists a further question relevant to the chronogeometric significance
of this metric/structure, on which one might take different views.
Namely: do there actually exist rods and clocks which survey this
metric/structure?
Different possible answers to this question distinguish two sub-
views within QGA. On the one hand, one might maintain that, when
the metric/structure features in a qualified explanation of the symme-
tries of the dynamical laws governing matter fields in the above sense,
there always exist physical rods and clocks built from matter fields
which survey that metric/structure. Call this view confident QGA.46
On the other hand, one might reject the claim that, when the met-
ric/structure features in a qualified explanation of the symmetries of
the dynamical laws governing matter fields in the above sense, there
always exist physical rods and clocks built from matter fields which
survey that metric/structure. Call this view cautious QGA.
Clearly, in order to call into question confident QGA, it suffices to
present a single problem case. In fact, there exist several such cases;
here I mention two. First, Pitts presents in [47] the example of univer-
sally coupled massive scalar gravity. In such theories, there exist two
Lorentizan metic fields: a dynamical field gab, and a fixed Minkowski
metric field ηab; the Lagrangian includes the following graviton mass
piece:47
Lmass = m
2
64piG
[ √−g
w − 1 +
√−gw√−η1−w
w (1− w) −
√−η
w
]
(20)
(Here, w is a free parameter, which may be fixed to yield specific
theories.) The important point to note about such theories is put
clearly by Pitts: “Massive scalar gravity lacks Minkowskian behav-
46Arguably, Maudlin falls into this camp, for he both (a) speaks of restricting dynamical
equations in SR to those which couple universally to ηab, thereby placing him in QGA
(cf. footnote 34); and (b) argues that, in any model of SR, there exists a clock which
satisfies the clock hypothesis, and thereby (by definition) correctly reads off intervals along
its worldline as given by the metric field (cf. [38, ch. 5]). There are good reasons to doubt
(b)—cf. [39], discussed further below.
47For the full details, see [47].
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ior of rods and clocks, though it has the Minkowski metric (among
other things) and the Poincare´ symmetry group. ... [T]he chronogeo-
metrically observable conformally flat metric gab = ηˆab(−g)1/4 isn’t
clearly the One True Geometry.”48 [47, p. 6] Thus, theories of this
kind appear to pose problems for confident QGA, for rods and clocks
generally do not survey ηab, in spite of the fact that this field couples
to the matter fields in the theory, and so may feature in a qualified
explanation of their symmetries.
As a second example, the authors of [39] demonstrate, drawing
upon recent work by Asenjo and Hojman [3], that there should be
no expectation that physical rods and clocks (such as light clocks)
correctly survey the metric field gab of GR in particular solutions of
this theory—namely in rotating solutions, such as the Go¨del and Kerr
solutions. The reasons are subtle, but essentially involve the fact that
physical propagating media, such as light waves, do not travel at a
fixed speed in such solutions, but rather manifest spacetime location-
dependent propagation speeds. The central point here is a simple
one: there is again reason to doubt confident QGA, for in these cases
one has dynamical equations governing matter fields which feature
coupling to gab, so that this metric field may feature in a qualified ex-
planation of the symmetries of these equations and the behaviour of
matter fields; nevertheless, rods and clocks do not survey this metric
field, so that the chronogeometric significance of this field is question-
able.
For these reasons, I take it that cautious QGA is to be preferred—
no a priori assumptions should be made regarding the behaviour of
physical rods and clocks, even in cases in which a partial explana-
tion of (e.g.) the symmetries of the dynamical equations in the theory
under consideration via a given metric/structure is possible. In the
remainder of this paper, I set this distinction aside for simplicity—
though (for the above reasons) it should be taken that reference to
QGA always means reference to cautious QGA.
5.3 Two miracles, reprise
With these subtleties regarding QGA addressed, I close this section
by arguing that this approach does not account for MR1 and MR2;
indeed, there is a sense in which MR1 and MR2 are more miraculous
on QGA, than on the dynamical approach.
To see this, consider first SR on QGA. As in the case of the
dynamical approach, on QGA it is conspiratorial—a ‘miracle’—that
48Indices in this passage have been altered for consistency with the present paper; there
is no change in content.
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all dynamical laws manifest the same symmetry properties, for recall
that, unlike UGA, QGA seeks no explanation for this coincidence
from within SR, in terms of ηab. Put in other words, it is a brute fact on
QGA that we do not consider other structures, such as δab, to which
the matter fields in the theory could couple, and as a result of which
coupling their dynamical laws would manifest different symmetries.
Thus, MR1 holds also on QGA.
Since the advocate of QGA also considers even fixed metric struc-
ture such as ηab to be ontologically autonomous, however, a second co-
incidence arises even in SR: why is it that the symmetries of this metric
field coincide with the symmetries of all dynamical laws? Clearly, this
is just MR2—again, another way to put the question is the follow-
ing: why should the structure to which all dynamical laws for matter
fields ‘advert’ be precisely the designated metric structure under con-
sideration? From this, we see therefore that on QGA, both MR1 and
MR2 hold even in the SR context. Since the dynamical approach faces
the single miracle MR1 in SR (since it ontologically reduces metric
structure in this theory to dynamical symmetries), this is, arguably,
reason to favour the dynamical approach over QGA in SR.
In the GR context, QGA also faces both MR1 and MR2—for
exactly the reasons delineated in §3.2.2. Given this, a new question
arises: given that both the dynamical approach and QGA agree in
the GR context that the gab field cannot be ontologically reduced to
matter fields, and that both MR1 and MR2 hold in that context, is
there really such a difference between the views, in this case? Absent
the story of ontological reduction, there appears to be very little be-
tween the views. In light of this, I make the following claim: While the
dynamical approach and QGA are distinct in the context of theories
with fixed metric structure such as SR (for they make different onto-
logical claims regarding this fixed structure), they are not distinct in
the context of theories with dynamical metric structure, such as GR.49
6 The geodesic principle
So far, I have: (a) clarified the distinction between the dynamical
and geometrical approaches—the latter itself coming in two distinct
49Again, I am grateful to Oliver Pooley for impressing this point upon me. In this
regard, cf. [48, p. 63], where Pooley writes, “What, then, is at stake between the metric-
reifying relationalist and the traditional substantivalist? Both parties accept the existence
of a substantival entity, whose structural properties are characterised mathematically by
a pseudo-Riemannian metric field and whose connection to the behaviour of material rods
and clocks depends on, inter alia, the truth of the strong equivalence principle. It is hard
to resist the suspicion that this corner of the debate is becoming merely terminological.”
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varieties: UGA and QGA; (b) argued that while QGA is viable,
UGA is not; (c) demonstrated that MR1 and MR2 hold both on
the dynamical approach and on QGA; (d) argued that there is no
difference between QGA and the dynamical approach in the context of
GR. In this section, I consider the connections between this work, and
recent and important results on the geodesic principle. I also reflect
upon work by Knox [32, 30, 31] and Weatherall [69, §6] pertinent to
the themes of this paper.
I begin with the geodesic principle. Contemporary work on this
result stems largely from a 1975 theorem of Geroch and Jang [23].
Though more sophisticated extensions of this result now exist (in par-
ticular, see [19, 24]), I focus for the time being upon the Geroch-Jang
theorem itself; this reads as follows:50
Theorem 1 (Geroch and Jang (1975)) For a given 〈M, gab〉, where
gab is a Lorentzian metric field on M , let γ : I → M be a smooth,
embedded curve. Suppose that, given any open subset O of M contain-
ing γ [I], there exists a smooth, symmetric field T ab with the following
properties:
1. T ab satisfies the strengthened dominant energy condition, i.e.
given any timelike vector ξa at any point p ∈ M , T abξaξb ≥ 0
and either T ab = 0 or T abξb is timelike;
2. T ab satisfies the conservation condition, i.e. ∇aT ab = 0;
3. supp
(
T ab
) ⊂ O; and
4. there is at least one point p ∈ O for which T ab (p) 6= 0.
Then γ is a timelike curve that may be reparameterised as a geodesic.
The Geroch-Jang theorem makes precise the essence of the geodesic
principle: that small bodies move on geodesics. In [69, §6], Weatherall
draws a number of philosophical lessons regarding geodesic theorems
such as the above (and its more sophisticated successors), which he
takes to be consonant with the dynamical approach; it is to these
putative lessons that I now turn.51 Begin with Weatherall’s summary
50Here, I use the notation of [69, p. 6].
51For Brown’s own discussion of the geodesic principle, see [6, §9.3]. With Brown’s
central contention—that geodesic motion of small bodies in GR is a consequence of the
Einstein field equations, and is therefore automatic in GR, in a way that it is not in
antecedent theories (“It is no longer a miracle.” [6, p. 163])—Weatherall is in disagreement,
for (a) geodesic motion is, in fact, independent of the Einstein field equations; (b) similar
results can be derived in other theories, e.g. NGT, and Newton-Cartan theory. (For the
details of Newton-Cartan theory, in which the gravitational potential ϕ of NCT is absorbed
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of the import of results such as the Geroch-Jang theorem:52
[E]stablishing that small bodies respect the inertial struc-
ture encoded by a given derivative operator ∇a requires
one to establish that the T ab field associated with matter is
divergence-free, or “conserved”, with respect to ∇a.53 [69,
p. 36]
Weatherall takes the fact that T ab is conserved with respect to a
specific derivative operator ∇a to deliver a connection between satis-
faction of the geodesic principle and spacetime geometry—with this
being particularly apparent if that derivative operator∇a is that which
is compatible with some metric field: [69, p. 38]
From this perspective it is also fair to say that, as Brown
argues in Physical Relativity, spacetime structures such as
the metric may be viewed as “a codification of certain key
aspects of the behaviour of particles and fields” (p. 142), at
least as regards the link between free, small-body motion
and the privileged class of curves picked out by a metric
and/or derivative operator.
Though I am in agreement with Weatherall as far as the above
statements go, there remains more to be said here, on two fronts.
First, though it is true that some connection between matter fields and
geometry is forged insofar as the stress-energy tensor associated with
these fields is conserved with respect to a specific derivative operator,
and moreover insofar as that matter thereby follows geodesics of that
derivative operator, in accordance with the Geroch-Jang theorem (or
its extensions), thus far the connection proceeds in terms of the motion
of small bodies alone. To move from such results regarding the geodesic
motion of small bodies, to the behaviour of matter fields tout court, is
in effect to demand that the local symmetry properties of all matter
fields be derivable from such geodesic motions; that is, it is, in effect,
into a (curved) derivative operator, see [37, ch. 4].) For Weatherall’s work on the geodesic
principle, see [69, 63, 62, 64, 70]; I am in agreement with him on these matters. Also
worthy of mention in this regard are remarks in a similar vein to (a) made by Pooley [48,
p. 543]; and an earlier paper of Malament [36], in which it is pointed out (pace Brown)
that geodesic motion in GR follows only on the assumption of the strengthened dominant
energy condition.
52Here, Weatherall’s notation has been amended slightly: I use ‘∇a’ rather than ‘∇’.
53In addition to the satisfaction of the strengthened dominant energy condition—again,
see the Geroch-Jang theorem as stated above.
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to demand a proof of a result akin to Schiff’s conjecture.54 Only in
that case could something like the SEP be delivered by this work on
the geodesic principle.55
Second, it is important to be clear that this work does not provide
a resolution to MR1. Even supposing that a connection is forged be-
tween geodesic motion and the local behaviour of matter fields more
generally (a` la Schiff’s conjecture), that the mystery of MR1 re-
mains can be demonstrated through asking the following question: why
should all matter fields have associated stress-energy tensors, the di-
vergences of which vanish with respect to the same derivative oper-
ator? If this were not the case, then it need not be the case that
all matter fields survey the same ‘practical geometry’, in the man-
ner explicated by Weatherall. Though it is true that, as Weatherall
observes [69, p. 11], the Einstein field equations tell us (via the con-
tracted Bianchi identity) that the covariant divergence of the total
stress-energy content of any particular solution of GR vanishes, this
is (again, as Weatherall observes—see [69, p. 12]) insufficient to in-
fer that the divergences of the stress-energy tensors associated with
all individual matter fields vanish with respect to the same derivative
operator. Thus, these results on the geodesic theorem do not place
54In the words of Thorne et al., “Schiff’s conjecture states that any complete and self-
consistent gravitation theory that obeys [the weak equivalence principle] must also, un-
avoidably, obey [the strong equivalence principle]” (emphasis in original) [59, p. 3575]. In
turn, the weak equivalence principle is defined as follows: “If an uncharged test body is
placed at an initial event in spacetime, and is given an initial velocity there, then its subse-
quent worldline will be independent of its internal structure and composition” (emphasis in
original) [59, p. 3571]; the strong equivalence principle is defined as: “(i) [The weak equiva-
lence principle] is valid, and (ii) the outcome of any local test experiment—gravitational or
nongravitational—is independent of where and when in the universe it is performed, and
independent of the velocity of the (freely falling) apparatus” [59, p. 3572]. For the original
presentation of Schiff’s conjecture, see [54, p. 343]; for ensuing discussion and attempted
proofs of restricted versions of the conjecture, see [13, 35, 43, 59]. Clearly, the version of
Schiff’s conjecture under consideration in this paper is different to that above—the gap to
be bridged here is between the geodesic motions of small bodies, and the symmetries of
matter fields tout court.
55Geroch and Weatherall demonstrate in [24] that source-free Maxwell fields ‘track’ null
geodesics—a new result. Since the geodesic theorems demonstrate that massive matter
moves on timelike geodesics, this gives access to both conformal and projective structure,
respectively. One might think, therefore, that one may appeal to the Ehlers-Pirani-Schild
result [20] (itself a generalisation of Weyl’s theorem—cf. [72]), that (subject to extra
constraints) conformal and projective structure fixes metric structure, to strengthen the
connection between these geodesic theorems and geometry. While such results do indeed
yield a further sense in which local geometry may be inferred from geodesic motions, they
continue to leave unbridged the gap between the geodesic motions of small bodies, and
the local dynamics of matter tout court. That is, Schiff’s conjecture remains unproven, in
general.
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sufficient restrictions on the behaviour of even small bodies built from
different matter fields in order to resolve MR1.
The situation regarding the bearing of these results upon MR2 is
more nuanced. Suppose that if the dynamical laws governing matter
fields all manifest the same symmetries, then the stress-energy ten-
sors associated with such matter fields (which satisfy the strengthened
dominant energy condition, and the other conditions of the Geroch-
Jang theorem and its generalisations) have covariant divergences which
vanish with respect to the same derivative operator. Now suppose
that the dynamical laws governing matter fields all manifest the same
symmetries. Then (by the above), the stress-energy tensors associ-
ated with such matter fields have covariant divergences which vanish
with respect to the same derivative operator. Then, divergence of the
total stress energy tensor (being a sum of the stress-energy tensors
associated with the individual matter fields) with respect to this same
derivative operator will also vanish; so, via the Einstein field equa-
tions, the left-hand side of the field equations will also have vanishing
divergence with respect to this derivative operator—implying that the
derivative operator is compatible with the metric field appearing in
the Einstein tensor. In that case, small bodies built from all mat-
ter fields ‘track’ geodesics of a derivative operator associated with the
Lorentzian metric field appearing in the Einstein field equations. In
turn, one expects that in such a case the symmetries of the dynamical
laws governing matter fields, and of this metric field, coincide, thereby
delivering MR2. Of course, this reasoning is heuristic—but renders
it prima facie plausible that these results regarding the geodesic prin-
ciple may have application in resolving MR2.
In any case, let us now set aside these considerations regarding
MR1 and MR2, and focus upon Weatherall’s general morals drawn
in [69, §6]. Consider the following passage:
[T]he reason that a metric (or metrics) and derivative op-
erator are able to codify the behavior of (generic) matter in
the way characterized by the geodesic principle is precisely
that that metric and derivative operator are the ones that
appear in the dynamics of (all) matter in the relevant ways.
And this, I think, is ultimately what is at the heart of the
matter.
As I see it, the most perspicuous explication of what one
means, or at least what one should mean, by the claim that
spacetime has some geometry, represented by a given met-
ric (or metrics) and derivative operator, is precisely that
one can express the dynamics of (all) matter in such a way
that all inner products are taken relative to that metric
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and all derivatives are taken relative to that derivative op-
erator. This is the physical content of the claim that there
are facts about distances, angles, and duration: physical
processes occur in such a way that changes in a quantity
at a time depend on the state of that quantity and those
facts about distances, angles, and duration. And so, one
is left with the conclusion that spacetime structures codify
certain facts about the behavior of matter because the dy-
namics of (all) matter is adapted to those spacetime struc-
tures, which is just another way of saying that spacetime
has that geometry. [69, pp. 39-40]
Though I am essentially in agreement with Weatherall on these
matters, three points are important to note regarding this passage.
First, and most straightforwardly, Weatherall (correctly) makes no
appeal to UGA—he makes no claim to the effect that the metric field
constrains all possible dynamical equations in a given theory, such
that assumptions about the symmetry properties of those laws need
not be made.
Second, nothing in this passage commits Weatherall either to the
dynamical approach, or to QGA. Insofar as Weatherall takes e.g. NGT
set in a Newtonian structure to be a coherent theory, there is perhaps
some reason to take him to favour the latter, for recall that the coher-
ence of this theory is questionable on the dynamical approach—cf. [10,
§3.1].56 Even in this case, however, one might take Weatherall’s an-
ticipated assessment that this theory is ‘theoretically equivalent’ (in
a technical, category-theoretic sense—cf. [65, 67, 71]) to NGT set in
a Galilean structure, combined with an implicit commitment to such
theoretical equivalence being sufficient for physical equivalence, to in-
dicate that he does not consider such to be the case—meaning that
perhaps he should be regarded as siding with advocates of the dynam-
ical approach after all.57
56In more detail, recall from footnote 44 that, on the dynamical approach, met-
ric/structure symmetries in theories with fixed metric/structure just are dynamical
symmetries—so how could it be the case that there exists a theory in which such symme-
tries do not coincide?
57I concede that it is somewhat strained to seek to read Weatherall as an advocate of the
dynamical approach; a reading on which he endorses something like QGA is more natural.
Nevertheless, it is at least worth noting that advocation of the dynamical approach is con-
sistent with Weatherall’s writings. (Moreover—and interestingly—Weatherall has ques-
tioned in personal communication whether fixed metric structure, such as the Minkowski
metric field of SR, should be regarded as being ontologically autonomous—in which case,
his views are arguably closer to the dynamical approach than one might initially think.
Whether, however, it is best to read Weatherall as endorsing the dynamical approach
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Third, Weatherall’s views as expressed in the above passage are
very consonant with the ‘spacetime functionalism’ of Knox [32, 30, 31],
according to which “the spacetime role is played by whatever defines a
structure of local inertial frames” [32, p. 22] (cf. §1). To see this, some
details regarding this programme of Knox must be recalled. Note first
that, in GR, the chronogeometricity of the metric field precisely guar-
antees that this field be considered spatiotemporal, in Knox’s sense.
The reason is that, locally, the symmetries of the dynamical metric
field coincide with those of the dynamical equations governing mat-
ter fields; in any frame in which these dynamical equations take their
simplest form, the metric field itself takes the form diag (−1, 1, 1, 1).
Thus, the metric field picks out a structure of local inertial frames—if
one characterises such frames as those in which dynamical equations
for non-gravitational fields take their simplest form (cf. [30, §2]).
Now recall that, for Weatherall, “what one means, or at least
what one should mean, by the claim that spacetime has some ge-
ometry, represented by a given metric (or metrics) and derivative op-
erator, is precisely that one can express the dynamics of (all) mat-
ter in such a way that all inner products are taken relative to that
metric and all derivatives are taken relative to that derivative opera-
tor” [66, p. 40]. But, so coupling the dynamical equations governing
matter fields will in general ensure that those equations have certain
local symmetry properties—as, for instance, our discussion of KGG
illustrated. In particular, it will in general ensure that metric sym-
metries coincide (locally) with dynamical symmetries—that is, it will
ensure that the metric field qualifies as spatiotemporal, on Knox’s
programme.58 Thus, when Weatherall states that such coupling is
sufficient for “spacetime to have some geometry”, I take it that he is
endorsing a view very much akin to Knox’s spacetime functionalism.59
versus e.g. the version of the geometrical approach due to Janssen [29, 4, 28], in which
the ontological autonomy of the metric field in e.g. SR is denied, remains unclear absent
further work. Since the issues here are subtle, and it would take significant work to do
justice to Janssen, these matters will have to wait for a future piece.)
58This coupling will ensure that a necessary condition on the metric field’s having
chronogeometric significance is satisfied—cf. §3.
59Of course, it is also worth remaining conscious of the differences between Knox and
Weatherall—for example, Weatherall makes no explicit commitment to inertial structure
as the sine qua non of spacetime.
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7 Conclusions
In the context of SR (and of theories with a fixed metric/structure60
more generally), advocates of the dynamical approach maintain that
such a metric/structure is ontologically reducible to (symmetries of
the dynamical laws governing) non-gravitational fields. By contrast, in
the context of GR (and of theories with a dynamical metric/structure
more generally), no such claim is made on the part of advocates of
the dynamical approach. As a result of this, the dynamical approach
arguably collapses into QGA in the GR context. While the dynamical
approach is distinct from UGA in both SR and GR, there are good
reasons to doubt the plausibility of UGA.
On QGA, we can appeal to the metric field of e.g. SR or GR to
explain certain universal facts about the dynamics of matter fields—
but only once further restrictions on the allowed class of models under
consideration are imposed (for example, assumptions regarding the
symmetries of the dynamical laws for non-gravitational fields, or—
relatedly—assumptions of the universal coupling of the metric field
under consideration to the matter fields in those dynamical equations,
etc.). Thus, on both the dynamical approach and QGA, as yet no
complete account of MR1 and MR2 exists within GR. Indeed, while
the dynamical approach faces only MR1 in the context of SR, QGA
faces both MR1 and MR2 in that theory; arguably, this reduction
in the number of ‘conspiracies’ in SR constitutes reason to favour
the former view over the latter. While work on geodesic principles
establishes some connection between the dynamics of matter and the
metric field of GR, this is in itself insufficient to account for MR1.
Though there exist some hints that such results may be used to resolve
MR2, more remains to be done in rendering these connections precise.
Weatherall may be understood as embracing Knox’s spacetime
functionalism, alongside either the dynamical approach, or QGA.
Since both the dynamical approach and QGA are defensible, this is
unproblematic. Indeed, arguably the geometrical approach has been
written off too quickly by advocates of the dynamical view, as a result
of a lack of appreciation of the viability of QGA. While I incline to
the dynamical view—essentially on grounds of ontological parsimony
in theories such as SR—I hope this paper may be of some value in
demonstrating that the views of essentially all parties in this debate
do not stand in such a state of conflict as one may prima facie be
inclined to think.
60‘Structure’ construed here in the sense of §5.2.2.
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